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TVA v. Hill Opinion Announcement 
Thursday, June 16, 1978 
437 U.S. 153 (1978) 
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Chief Justice Warren Burger 
—dissenting comment by Justice Lewis Powell 
 
 
 
Chief Justice Warren Burger 
 
I have the judgment and opinion for the Court to announce in Tennessee Valley 
Authority against Hill.  And I will discuss it only briefly.  
 
This case has been identified as one involving a three-inch fish which on the occasion of 
the argument the Attorney General brought to the lectern encased in a small flask.  It is 
a species of the perch family which will, according to all the evidence in the case and 
the findings of the Secretary of Interior, be exterminated if the Tellico Dam, which is 
part of the TVA complex, is allowed to operate.  The case also involves a one hundred 
and twenty million dollar dam which was authorized by the Congress and that dam is 
virtually completed and ready to operate.   
 
In reality in the view of the majority of the Court the case involves something more 
important than either a three-inch fish which is endangered as a species or even than 
the one hundred and twenty million dollar dam. As the majority of the Court sees it, 
some very important and fundamental principles of the separation of powers are at 
stake.   
 
Congress has categorically provided that no project may be carried out if it endangers 
the existence of any species which the Secretary of the Interior declares is endangered, 
and he has done so here.  We hold that under the established precedents of this Court 
and under very express and explicit rules of the Congress an appropriation or 
continued appropriations do not repeal an express statute.  In our view the Congress 
has wisely, or not, decreed that the endangered species have priority over even a multi-
million dollar dam.  In 1966, in the Endangered Species Act of that date, and again in 
the 1969 act, Congress declared that the endangered species were to be protected, in 
fact, so far as practicable. But in the 1973 act, which is the statute before us, it 
removed—it very pointedly removed—those qualifying provisions and created, as we 
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see it, an absolute duty to preserve all endangered species.  We emphasize that under 
the Constitution judges have limited functions and we do not review the soundness or 
the wisdom of what Congress does.   
 
I will read the essence of the opinion I think briefly from the opinion itself which is filed 
this morning: 
 
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of the particular 
course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the 
process of interpreting a statute.  Once the meaning of an enactment is 
discerned and its constitutionality determined the judicial process comes to 
an end.  We do not sit as a committee of review nor are we vested with the 
power of veto.  And accordingly we agree with the Court of Appeals of the 
6th Circuit that in our Constitutional system, the commitment to the 
separation of powers is too fundamental and too important for us to 
preempt Congressional action by judicially decreeing what would seem to 
accord to us as the common sense and the public weal.  Our Constitution 
vests all such responsibilities in the political branches and the matter is 
now in the hands of Congress.   
 
 
 
Justice Powell: 
 
I dissent orally because the Court’s decision as I view it is quite erroneous and would 
create serious and far reaching consequences.   
 
As the Chief Justice has stated, this is the famous snail darter case.  The darter is a three-
inch fish practically indistinguishable from any similar small fish.  This has been called 
the case of a three-inch fish against a hundred and twenty million dollar Tellico dam 
project, a project located on a little Tennessee river.   
 
Today the fish wins 100%,—although the dam has been completed and all that remains 
is to close the gate—this Court will now issue a permanent injunction.  A great reservoir 
project designed to serve an impoverished area of Tennessee is ended.   
 
This remarkable result comes about in this way.  The endangered species act, adopted 
in 1973, has a commendable objective preserving species of animal and plant life and 
their habitats where they are endangered.  In the same year the snail darter was 
discovered and two years later, in 1975, the Secretary of Interior found that the Tellico 
project would result in destruction of the snail darter’s habitat.  In February 1976, with 
the project 80% completed, respondents filed this suit to enjoin completion and 
operation of the dam.  The district court held that Congress could not have intended to 
 3 
produce such an absurd result.  The words I use are those of the district court. But the 
Court of Appeals held and this Court now agrees that the language of the Act requires 
the result, however absurd it may be.   
 
If the language were indeed perfectly clear, it would be as the Chief Justice states the 
duty of this Court to enforce it, regardless of the consequences.  It is not the province of 
the judicial branch to rectify policy or political judgments of the legislative branch, 
however egregiously we may think they disserve the public interest.  The issue thus 
presented to us was one of statutory construction.   
 
Did Congress intend to end federal projects whenever some form of life is endangered 
by their continued operation?  The Court thinks that both the language and history of 
the Act requires this result.  It is here that I disagree.  The statutory language certainly is 
no credit to whoever drafted it.  It may be read as the Court reads it, but it need not be 
so read.  It need not be read as applying to completed or nearly completed projects.  
This Court has said on more than one occasion, and here I quote: “that literal 
application of a statute that would lead to absurd consequences is to be avoided 
whenever a reasonable application can be given consistent with the legislative 
purpose.”   
 
Thus a central inquiry is ascertainment of Congressional purpose and intent.  I think it 
is plain from the total legislative history that Congress intended no such result as that 
reached by the Court today.  I reveal briefly the highlights.  The Tellico project was 
authorized in 1966, seven years  before the Endangered Species Act was adopted and 10 
years before this suit was filed.  In every year since 1966 Congress has appropriated 
funds for the construction and completion of this project.  Since 1975 the appropriations 
committees of both houses have been fully advised of the project’s effect on the snail 
darter.  With all other facts before them, these committees have continued to fund the 
project.  Moreover, in their reports to the Congress they stated unequivocally that the 
Act was not intended to halt this project.  The committees recommendations were 
approved by both houses of Congress and signed in three consecutive years by the 
President of the United States.   
 
The Court brushes aside this post-enactment history and relies on contemporary 
statements it deems to be supportative of its view,  statements adopted at the time that 
the statute was enacted.  Typical of these statements is one by a member of Congress 
emphasizing the importance of which everyone agrees of preserving endangered 
species.  This congressman said that the Air Force must discontinue bombing practice 
along the Gulf Coast of Texas if this endangers the whooping crane.  I would certainly 
agree with that.  But there is not even a hint in the legislative history that Congress 
intended to compel the undoing or abandonment of completed federal projects.  No 
testimony was taken on this possibility, not a single congressman discussed it.   
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If Congress had been aware that the Act could be used to terminate major federal 
projects authorized years earlier or to require abandonment of essential federal 
installations, common sense tells us that there would have been legislative hearings, 
there would have been testimony, certainly there would have been debate concerning 
the consequences so wasteful, so inimicable to purposes previously deemed important 
by the Congress and so likely to arouse public outrage.   
 
The absence of any such consideration by the Committees or in the floor debate 
indicates beyond all question that no one intended today’s consequences.  These 
consequences unfortunately are not limited to the Tellico project.  The Court’s decision 
casts a long shadow over the continued operation of even the most important projects.  
Projects serving vital needs of society as well as national defense.  If continued 
operation endangers a survival, or the critical habitat of a newly discovered species of 
water spider or cockroach, operation of the project could be brought to a halt.   
 
If Congress acts expeditiously, the Court’s decision probably will have no lasting 
adverse consequences.  But I have not thought it to be the province of this Court to force 
Congress into otherwise unnecessary action to produce a result no one ever intended.  
Mr. Justice Blackman joins me in this dissent, Mr. Justice Rehnquist has filed a separate 
dissenting opinion.   
 
 
     
